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Abstract 
 
Does ethical differentiation of products affect market behavior? We examined this 
issue in triopolistic experimental markets where producers set prices. One producer’s costs 
were  higher  than  the  others.  In  two  treatments,  the  additional  costs  were  attributed  to 
compliance  with  ethical  guidelines.  In  the  third,  no  justification  was  provided.  Many 
participants playing the role of consumers reduced their experimental gains by purchasing the 
ethically differentiated product at a higher price – whether or not they knew the amount of 
extra cost. Individual differences were important (students of business/economics paid smaller 
premia than others). Finally, we speculate about the observed “demand function” for ethics 
and  emphasize  the  use  of  experimental  methodology  to  complement  empirical  studies 
designed to assess the potential market for ethically differentiated products.   
 
 
Keywords:   Fair trade;  ethical premia;  price competition; contextual effects.       
JEL classification:  A13, B41, D43, D46.   3 
In recent years, an increasing number of firms have started to signal that their products 
are produced under "fair" conditions (e.g., no child labor or no exploitation of agricultural 
workers). In 2002, for example, the total market for such "ethical consumption" was estimated 
at ₤19.9 billion in the UK alone (Cooperative Bank, 2003). In the EU and the USA, fair trade 
organizations reported increases in sales of labeled products for 2003 over 2002 that varied 
between 42% and 91%. Moreover, similar  growth rates have been observed for several years 
(for data see FLO, 2005 and TransfairUSA, 2004).  
Prices  of  fair  trade  products  are  typically  higher  than  those  of  the  substantially 
equivalent  products  with  which  they  compete  in  the  marketplace.  And  yet,  there  is  little 
empirical evidence about the conditions under which consumers are prepared to pay higher 
prices, i.e., “ethical premia.” In discussing the role of ethics in the market place, Shleifer 
(2004) uses the example of child labor stating that “if public opinion really turns against child 
labor, firms that do not hire children will be able to charge higher prices” (p. 417). Knowing 
when, and to what degree such shifts in preferences occur is clearly an important practical 
issue. 
Several  surveys  have  already  estimated  consumers’  willingness  to  pay  for  ethical 
products
1 (see, e.g., Pelsmacker, Driesen & Ryap, 2003). These data are hypothetical and 
represent attitudes that may or may not result in purchases. Thus, it is legitimate to question 
whether they generalize to market behavior (Carrigan & Atalla, 2001; Tallontire, Rentsendorj 
& Blowfield, 2001). In addition, although econometric studies using market data are more 
credible (cf., Bjorner, Hansen & Russell, 2004), they are subject to market frictions (e.g., 
limited distribution to special stores, lack of consumer information) and the variability that 
consumers face in observed ethical premia is limited.  
                                                
1 We use the term “ethical” in a broad sense to cover considerations of so-called “fair trade” and more specific 
issues such as labor standards, discrimination, and the like.    4 
Recently,  some  researchers  have  used  field  experiments  as  a  methodology  to 
overcome these problems. Anderson and Hanson (2004) report  an experiment conducted at 
two Home Depot stores in Oregon, where “ecolabeled” and unlabeled plywood products were 
sold side by side. They found that the labeled version of the product accounted for 37 % of all 
sales  when  priced  at  a  premium  of  2%.  Kimeldorf  et  al.  (2006)  use  a  “good  working 
conditions” label to differentiate otherwise equivalent sport socks in a department store in 
Michigan. They show that, even at a price premium of 40%, nearly a quarter of sales are from 
the labeled version of the product. They further show that the share of “ethical” sales is 
sensitive to changes in the size of the premium. While field experiments have the advantage 
of unambiguously testing “true” purchasing actions in the presence of a labeled product, they 
also face serious difficulties. For instance, as the authors of both studies point out, consumer 
information about the label is difficult to assure in a field setting.
2 In addition, field studies 
cannot control for sample selection since customers may seek or avoid the choice between 
labeled and non-labeled versions of a product. 
The purpose of this paper is to apply the methodology of experimental economics to 
assess how much consumers are prepared to pay for “ethically produced” goods and thereby 
complement evidence from field studies. The principal advantages are that tradeoffs between 
ethical values and monetary incentives are measured by consumers’ choices in controlled 
settings, and that all participants have to make these decisions under conditions of sufficient 
and equal information. More specifically, we constructed a triopolistic experimental market 
environment  with  fixed  demand  and  posted-offer  pricing,  where  three  producers  and  six 
consumers interacted in a finitely repeated trading sequence. We chose oligopolistic price 
competition for its simplicity and close resemblance to commonly observed retail markets.  
Experimental studies of such price competition confirm theoretical Bertrand predictions for 
three or more producers (Fouraker & Siegel, 1963; Dufwenberg & Gneezy, 2000).  With this 
                                                
2 Interviews in the sport socks study revealed that more than half of all consumers either did not notice or did not   5 
design, we sought to observe producers’ pricing behavior and consumers’ purchases when an 
ethical dimension is at play. We introduced an asymmetry in production costs, as done by 
Gneezy and Nagel (2001) for a comparison of symmetric and asymmetric cost in duopoly 
markets, but explicitly linked this to an ethical issue. For consumers, the ethical issue was that 
one  firm’s  products  were  differentiated  as  involving  no  child  labor.  This  was  made 
operational by donating the amount of extra costs to an NGO fighting child labor. Moreover, 
experimental participants observed these payments being made on-line by internet.     
 We observed frequent premia for the ethically differentiated version of the product in 
the experimental markets. Our results showed that many consumers paid ethical premia of 
different sizes, thereby reducing their monetary gains. Ethical producers recovered profits per 
unit similar to other producers. Moreover, if consumers lacked explicit knowledge of costs 
incurred  by  producers  to  meet  ethical  standards,  they  still  paid  a  premium  for  ethically 
produced  goods.  At  the  same  time,  we  noted  the  importance  of  individual  differences 
(students of business and economics were less willing to pay ethical premia than those from 
other social sciences and the humanities). We further demonstrated that willingness-to-pay as 
measured by attitudes was significantly lower for consumers who had previously participated 
in an ethical market session as opposed to those who had not. This has important implications 
for the use of surveys in determining the potential size of markets for ethical goods.   
Our  use  of  experimentation  is  in  line  with  recent  developments  in  experimental 
methodology, which propagates the use of context in experimental instructions when this is 
relevant to the research question (Harrison & List, 2004, p.1028; Hogarth, 2005; Cooper, 
Kagel, Lo, & Gu, 1999). In the present investigation, we are asking what happens in a market 
situation when a specific kind of label is attached to a product. In our case of an ethical label, 
economic  actors  are  faced  with  tradeoffs  between  ethical  values  and  changes  in  their 
monetary gains. As such, manipulation of context is essential to our experimental design. 
                                                                                                                                                   
understand the label.   6 
Finally, we note that the importance of similar contextual effects has been recognized for 
some time in the related field of behavioral decision making (see, e.g., Einhorn & Hogarth, 
1981; Kahneman & Tversky, 2000; Slovic, Finucane, Peters & MacGregor, 2002).  
 
Experimental design 
In the experiment, three producers and six consumers exchanged units of a product 
during 15 periods. In each period, producers first simultaneously posted their prices per unit. 
Subsequently, consumers purchased the product simultaneously. Consumers had to buy three 
units in each period, but they were free to choose from which producer(s) they wanted to buy. 
After  each  period,  producers  received  the  full  history  of  prices  and  sales.  Hence,  each 
experimental session involved 15 periods of a triopolistic experimental market with a fixed 
demand of 18 units per period, i.e., 270 units per experimental session. Consumers were 
allocated a fixed budget of 300 ECU (Experimental Currency Units) per period and kept the 
money unspent. Two producers, A and B, incurred production costs of 20 ECU per unit. 
Producer C had a production cost of 25 ECU. Producers were free to choose a price between 
their cost of production (the minimum) and a maximum of 100 ECU. For every unit sold, 
producers’ profits were the difference between their price and production cost. 
We ran three treatments. Treatments 1 and 2 were meant to create an experimental 
analogue to ethical differentiation as experienced in the marketplace. In these treatments, 
producers were described as international firms whose production facilities were in regions 
where child labor was prevalent. Producer C was said to comply with the conditions of an 
internationally  recognized  NGO  fighting  child  labor.
3  We  provided  details  of  the  NGO’s 
activities  and  the  conditions  necessary  for  use  of  its  label.  Meeting  these  requirements, 
however, implied an increase in production costs. Producer C thus incurred an additional cost 
                                                
3 This was part of the hypothetical market frame. Participants knew that producers were randomly assigned by us 
to play the role of producer A, B, or C.   7 
per unit. On the screen, Producer C was labeled with an asterisk (*). Participants were further 
informed  that,  for  every  unit  sold  by  Producer  C*,  a  donation  equal  to  the  additional 
production cost would be paid to an NGO fighting child labor (the specific industry in which 
the  NGO  operates  was  not  revealed).  At  the  end  of  each  experimental  session,  the 
accumulated ethical contributions were transferred on-line to the NGO in the presence of the 
participants (cf., Eckel & Grossman, 1996). Hence, by providing specific ethical reasons for 
the additional costs and by linking purchasing  decisions to real donations, we created an 
ethical differentiation. When Producer C* was not the cheapest, consumers faced a trade-off 
between wealth and ethics.  
In treatment 1 – labeled “ethical differentiation - extra cost known” – consumers knew 
that the amount of extra cost incurred by producer C* for complying with the NGO’s standard 
was  5  ECU.  In  treatment  2  –  labeled  “ethical  differentiation  -  extra  cost  unknown”  – 
consumers were aware that producer C* incurred extra costs, but did not know the amount. 
For both treatments we conducted six experimental sessions with 54 participants (i.e., a total 
of 108 participants). 
Treatment  3  was  a  control  condition  with  “pure  cost  differentiation  –  extra  cost 
known”.  Here, the instructions simply stated that producers were three international firms 
competing in a market, and that producer C incurred production costs that were 5 ECU per 
unit higher than those of A and B. Thus, in this control treatment no reason was provided for 
the extra production cost. Six sessions were run with 54 participants.  
Treatment  1  served  as  a  benchmark.  We  gave  consumers  as much information  as 
possible. In treatment 2 we wanted to approximate the more natural setting where the amount 
of extra production costs is unknown. The goal of treatment 3 (pure cost differentiation) was 
simply  to  test  whether  results  in  treatments  1  and  2  could  be  attributed  to  the  ethical 
dimension.        8 
The  experiments  were  conducted  in  the  Experimental  Economics  Laboratory  at 
Pompeu  Fabra  University.  Subjects  were  undergraduate  volunteers from  various  fields  of 
study (mostly economics, business, humanities, political sciences). A session lasted between 
sixty  and  ninety  minutes.  This  included  completing  a  post-experimental  questionnaire. 
Participants  earned  on average  €8.06  plus  a  show-up  fee  of  €5.  At  the  beginning  of  the 
experiments, participants were randomly assigned to computers, then the instructions were 
distributed and  also  read  out  aloud.  Participants  learned  their  roles  when  the  first  screen 




Treatment 1: “ethical  differentiation  - extra cost known.”   In all  six sessions, the 
average posted price of producer C* was higher than the average posted price of producers A 
and B. Over all six sessions, the average price posted by C* was 39.8 ECU while the average 
price posted by producers A and B together was 33.3 ECU.
 The dynamics of average prices 
over all six sessions for C* compared to A and B is shown in Figure 1a. In 14 out of 15 
periods, producer C* posted on average higher prices than producers A and B. 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 and Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
In the upper left section of Table 1, we show how the prices of C* compared with 
those of A and B. Producer C* posted the highest price in 64 of the 90 periods (71%) and 
accounted for 195 purchased units (17% of the total). In 24 periods (27%), C*’s price lay 
between that of A and B, yielding a market share of 25%. When C*’s price was the lowest, it 
captured 97% of the market (but this only occurred in 2 periods). Overall, producer C* sold 
337 (21%) of all units, for which consumers paid an average price of 34.7 ECU. Producers A 
and B together sold 1,283 units (79%) at an average price of 26.8 ECU; 1,261 of these units   9 
(i.e., 98.%) were purchased at the minimum price posted in the respective periods (not shown 
in  Table  1).  In  contrast,  only  35  of  the  337  units  sold  by  producer  C*  (i.e.  10%)  were 
purchased at the minimum price. 
Treatment 2: “ethical differentiation - extra cost unknown.”  In five out of six sessions 
the average price of producer C* was higher than the average price of A and B. Over all six 
sessions, producer C* posted an average price of 33.93 ECU, while producers A and B posted 
an average price of 24.87 ECU – see Figure 1b. 
As shown in the upper right section of Table 1, C* posted the highest price in 75 
periods (83%); in these periods he sold 27% of all units. In 9 periods C*’s price lay between 
that of A and B and accounted for 28% of sales. In the 6 periods where C*’s price was the 
lowest, he sold 100 of 108 units (92%). Over all periods, C* sold 510 units (31%) for which 
consumers paid an average price of 31.70 ECU. Producers A and B sold a total of 1110 units 
(69%) for an average price of 23.60 ECU; 1094 of these units (i.e., 99%) were purchased at 
the minimum price posted in the respective periods (not shown in Table 1), whereas only 100 
of the 510 units sold by producer C* were purchased at minimum price (i.e., 20%). 
Control treatment: “pure cost differentiation – extra cost known.”  In all six sessions 
the average price of producer C was higher than the average price of A and B. The high-cost 
producer  C  posted  an  average  price  of  41.23  ECU,  while  producers  A  and  B  posted  an 
average price of 34.56 ECU.  As shown in the lower left section of Table 1, C posted the 
highest price on the market in 61 periods (68%), in which he made 2% of all sales (i.e., 24 of 
1098 units). In 15 periods, C had the intermediate price and sold only 15 units (6%). In the 14 
periods (16%) for which he posted the lowest price, he made 79% of all sales (i.e., 198 of 252 
units). 
Overall, C sold a total of 237 units (15%), for which consumers paid an average price 
of 38.72 ECU. A and B sold a total of 1383 units (85%) for an average price of 27.30 ECU;   10 
1318 of the units sold by A and B (i.e. 95%) were purchased for the minimum price posted in 
the respective periods (not shown in Table 1). Of the 237 units sold by C, 207 (i.e., 87%) were 
purchased for the minimum price. 
 
Discussion 
Pricing behavior. We constructed the experiment to reflect an ethical differentiation in 
a  market  for  an  otherwise  substantially  equivalent  product.  We  suspected  that  producers 
incurring extra production costs for an ethical reason would price their product at a premium.  
Indeed, as noted previously, C*’s average price was significantly higher in both treatments 
with ethical differentiation (ethical differentiation - extra cost known: 39.8 ECU for C* vs. 
33.3 ECU for A and B, t = 4.13, p < .01, df = 5; Wilcoxon Rank Sum test (WRS): Z = -2.2, p 
< .05;  ethical differentiation - extra cost unknown: 33.9 ECU for C* vs. 24.9 ECU for A and 
B, t = 2.28, p < .1; WRS: Z = -2.0, p < .05). In contrast, the difference between the mean 
premia of A and B is not statistically significant (ethical differentiation - extra cost known: t = 
0.52, ns, df = 5; WRS: Z = -1.2, ns; ethical differentiation - extra cost unknown: t = 0.10, ns, 
df = 5; WRS: Z = -.1,ns).
  
The control treatment shows that pure cost differentiation also induced producers to 
price higher (41.2 ECU for C and 34.6 ECU for A and B; t = 2.36; p < .1; WRS: Z = -2.2, p < 
.05). Thus, it is difficult to disentangle the effects of ethical and cost differentiation on price 
setting. In any case, the experiments show that producers do not price substantially equivalent 
products identically.
4  
 Purchasing  actions.  We  refer  to  prices  that  exceed  the  minimum  posted  price  as 
involving positive premia (i.e., premium equals price less minimum price posted in period). 
                                                
4 As noted previously, both theory and experimental evidence (Fouraker & Siegel, 1963; Dufwenberg & Gneezy, 
2000) suggest Bertrand outcomes for three producers. Our results deviate significantly from this prediction – see 
Figure 1. The inelastic demand in our design may contribute to this difference in market outcomes.    11 
For substantially equivalent products, one might expect consumers to buy all units from the 
lowest price producer, i.e., at a zero premium. We refer to this as the “standard prediction.” 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 2 through 4 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
In both treatments with ethical differentiation, purchases from producers A and B were 
largely in line with this prediction. In treatment 1, only 22 of 1283 units (2%) were sold at 
prices  above  the  minimum,  and  16  out  of  1110  units  (1%)  in  treatment  2.  In  contrast, 
consumers  paid  a  premium  for  302  of  337  units  (90%)  of  C*’s  version  of  the  good  in 
treatment 1 and for 410 of 510 units (80%) in treatment 2, thereby suggesting that these 
purchases were motivated by ethical considerations. Moreover, in the control treatment with 
pure cost differentiation, the high-cost firm C sold only 34 of its 237 units (13%) at a positive 
premium, compared to 65 of 1383 units (5%) sold by firms A and B. Figures 2a,b and 3a,b 
show premia and corresponding market shares for all periods of all six sessions in each of the 
two  ethical  differentiation  treatments.  To  be  consistent  with  the  standard  prediction,  all 
observations should lie either on the horizontal axes (i.e., positive premia imply zero market 
shares) or on the vertical axes (i.e., positive market shares with zero premia). Across both 
treatments, for all 360 observations for producers A and B, 337 (94%) do indeed lie on one of 
the two axes. In contrast, this is only true for 29 of 180 periods (16%) for the ethical firm C*. 
In 151 cases consumers paid positive premia.  
In the control treatment with pure cost differentiation, consumer behavior is largely 
consistent with the standard prediction. For the 90 periods, this is true for 76, 73, and 71 
periods for the products of A, B, and C, respectively. The pattern of the data in Figure 4a is 
similar to that of producers A and B in Figure 4b, and not to that of producer C* in Figures 2a 
and 3a. Consumers do not pay positive premia for a purely cost differentiated product.   12 
In  conclusion,  many  consumers  paid  positive  premia  for  ethically  differentiated 
products. Without ethical differentiation, consumers typically purchased at the lowest price, 
irrespectively  of  the  producers’  costs.  Interestingly,  paying  an  ethical  premium  does  not 
require knowledge of the extra costs needed to conform to ethical guidelines. If anything, in 
our experiments higher premia were paid when such extra production costs were unknown.
5 
Profits and sales from ethical production. The sales figures shown in Table 1 indicate 
that, across both ethical differentiation treatments, the ethical producer C* had an overall 
market share of 26% (847 of 3,240 units). C*’s average price per unit sold was higher than 
those of A and B (32.9 vs. 25.3), and the difference between them (7.6 ECU) exceeds the 
additional 5 ECU production cost paid by C*. Thus, the sales margin per unit is higher for C*. 
Also, the ethical producer makes more profits than A and B. C*’s average profits per session 
are 557 ECU, while A and B gain 529 ECU on average. The average donations per session are 
353 ECU. 
Separating  the  data  for  treatments  1  and  2,  however,  profits  and  sales  are  quite 
different. In the “extra cost known” treatment, C*’s market share is 21% with an average sales 
price per unit sold of 34.7 ECU (vs. 26.8 for A and B). Due to the low market share, C* in 
this treatment makes less average profit than producers A and B (545 ECU vs. 724 ECU). In 
the “extra cost unknown” treatment, C*’s market share is 31% with an average sales price per 
unit sold of 31.7 ECU (vs. 23.6 for A and B), which leads to a higher average profit for C* 
(570 ECU vs. 333 ECU). In accordance with the differences in market share, the average 
amount of donations in this treatment is higher than in the “extra cost known” treatment (425 
ECU vs. 281 ECU). 
These figures  suggest, almost  paradoxically,  that  ethical firms  stand to gain  when 
consumers are ignorant of the costs of compliance with ethical standards. The direction of the 
                                                
5  In the “extra cost unknown“ treatment, it seems natural to ask what prior distributions consumers might have 
had concerning the additional costs incurred by Producer C*. Surprisingly, post-experimental questionnaires   13 
difference, however, may be specific to the amount of extra cost that we examined, i.e., 5 
ECU.  
 
Ethical purchasing behavior 
  Each  of  the  two  ethical  treatments  (i.e.,  “extra  cost  known”  and  “extra  cost 
unknown”) with 36 consumers that faced 15 periods of different price constellations provides 
a data set of 540 purchasing observations. For both treatments, we want to explain the number 
of units a consumer purchases from the ethical producer in a certain period. By construction 
of the experiment this is limited to 0, 1, 2, or 3 units.  
We specify models of the following form 
,
'
it i it it e u x y + + = b                   (1) 
where the index i denotes the different individuals (i = 1,…, 36) and t denotes different time 
periods (t =1,…,15). The vector x consists of explanatory variables (to be defined below), and 
the  error  term  differentiates  between  unobserved  individual  effects,  ui,  and  idiosyncratic 
errors, eit.  
  We considered three types of explanatory variables: price, individual characteristics, 
and time/wealth. To show the effects of price, we included both the ethical premium and the 
minimum price in each period using the latter to represent the price level. These variables 
vary across both time and individuals. The only individual variable (codified by a dummy) we 
considered  was  whether  participants  were  students  of  economics/business.  To  filter  out 
possible primacy effects, we included dummy variables for the “first 3 periods”. Last, we 
included  the  gain  a  consumer  had  already  accumulated  prior  to  the  purchasing  decision 
(wealth).  
                                                                                                                                                   
revealed that less than two thirds of consumers had such expectations at all.      14 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------------------  
We tested different specifications of equation (1), the results of which are summarized 
in Table 2. The standard OLS regression does not use the panel characteristics of the data nor 
take into account the categorical nature of the dependent variable but can serve as a first 
approximation. We next performed both fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) analyses.  
We rejected the fixed effects model by testing that there was significant variance in u, the 
individual effects for both data sets (χ
2 (1) = 289.8 for "extra cost known"; χ
2 (1) = 509.4 for 
"extra cost unknown"). For the data from "extra cost known", the Hausman test allows us to 
reject the null hypothesis that there is correlation between x and u (p = .36). For the data from 
"extra cost unknown"  we cannot reject this hypothesis (p  = .01). However, since we are 
primarily  interested  in  directional  effects  and  their  statistical  significance,  and  since  the 
individual effects are of particular importance to our analysis, we decided to prefer a random 
effects over a fixed effects specification for both data sets. We next sought to improve model 
specification by matching distributional assumptions with the count data characteristics of the 
dependent variable (0, 1, 2, or 3 ethical units, cf. Cameron & Trivedi, 1998). Specifically, we 
estimated  the  Poisson  RE  and  negative  binomial  RE  models  and  found  little  difference 
between their coefficients. Since the negative binomial RE is less restrictive (i.e., allowing for 
over-dispersion), we deem this model to be the most plausible for these data. In general, the 
results in Table 2 are remarkably robust across the different specifications.    
Price dependence. It is reasonable to assume that higher ethical premia are less likely 
to be accepted by consumers than lower ones.  Indeed, for both treatments this is confirmed in   15 
our  data  by  the  coefficient  for  the  ethical  premium  variable  that  is  negative  and  highly 
significant.
6    
 The  coefficient  for  the  price  level  variable  tests  dependence  of  purchases  on  the 
general price level. This is positive and significant for both treatments and indicates that a 
given premium is more likely to be accepted at a higher price level. It also raises the issue of 
whether consumers accept to pay premia based on their absolute value or  relative to the price 
of the regular product. However, this issue requires further research. 
Effects of university education.  Whereas much evidence exists documenting a relation 
between type of reasoning and educational discipline (see, e.g., Nisbett, Fong, Lehman & 
Cheng, 1987), does training in economics and business affect the paying of ethical premia? 
Larrick, Morgan and Nisbett (1990) showed important effects across different contexts for 
economic  cost-benefit  reasoning  (see also, Larrick, Nisbett & Morgan, 1993);  and Frank, 
Gilovich and Regan (1993) have documented that economics students act less cooperatively 
in  Prisoner  Dilemma  games.  However,  it  is  not  clear  whether  this  apparently  more  self-
interested behavior generalizes to participants’ natural environments (see Yezer , Goldfarb & 
Poppen, 1996).  
Of the 72 undergraduates playing the roles of consumers in our ethical treatments, 45 
(63%) were students of economics or business and the rest from other fields (law, humanities, 
and other social sciences). Thus, given that these participants made choices under market 
conditions,  our  experiment  provides  a  sharp  test  of  the  effects  of  economics  or  business 
training on the payment of ethical premia. The models specified in Table 2 show a significant 
and  negative  impact  of  the  relevant  dummy  variable  in  both  ethical  treatments.  That  is, 
students  of  economics  or  business  at    Pompeu  Fabra  University  bought  less  units  of  an 
ethically differentiated good than students from other fields of studies. It would, of course, be 
                                                
6 Out of 439 purchases that involved ethical units, consumers bought all 3, 2, or only 1 unit of the ethical version 
in 177, 54, and 208 cases, respectively.   16 
interesting to test whether this result generalizes to other student populations. More generally, 
the finding raises the issue of identifying segments of populations of consumers who are more 
or less likely to pay ethical premia.
  
Primacy  and  wealth  effects.  One  might  expect  greater  prominence  of  the  ethical 
dimension  at  the  outset  of  the  experiment  when  the  salience  of  the  ethical  issue  in  the 
instructions is most recent. We test this suspicion by introducing a dummy for the first three 
periods.  Table 2  shows that this does not seem to  be the case, since for both treatments 
coefficients in the OLS regression are not significantly different from zero. We dropped this 
variable for the other models. Furthermore, greater gains prior to the purchasing action could 
lead to higher acceptance of ethical premia, in the sense that one can better afford to be ethical 
at higher wealth levels. Here, the results of our data are ambiguous. While the coefficient in 
the "extra cost known" treatment is insignificant, it has the expected positive sign and is 
significant  (p  <  .05)  for  all  models  in  the  "extra  cost  unknown"  treatment.  A  possible 
explanation may be that both wealth and information about production costs can serve as 
justifications  for  purchasing  actions,  but  that,  when  available,  cost  information  is  the 
dominant factor. Only when such information is missing, does wealth influence acceptance of 
ethical premia. 
 
Willingness-to-pay statements and experienced behavior 
One goal of the present work was to circumvent the attitude-behavior gap that renders 
questionable willingness-to-pay statements in survey studies. Whereas we could not assess the 
size of such a gap in our experiments, the post-questionnaire completed by all participants can 
illuminate the more general role of prior experience in making willingness-to-pay statements. 
Specifically,  we  compare  such  statements  between  the  36  participants  who  had  acted  as 
consumers in the “ethical differentiation - extra cost known” treatment (henceforth labeled   17 
“experienced”),  and  the  36  participants  who  had  acted  as  consumers  in  the  "pure  cost 
differentiation  –  extra  cost  known"  control  treatment,  where  no  ethical  dimension  was 
involved (henceforth labeled “inexperienced”). In the post-questionnaire, the inexperienced 
were presented with details of the ethical issue and the NGO in the same manner as the 
instructions  for  the  ethical  differentiation  treatments  of  the  experiment.  Both  groups  of 
participants were asked how much more they would be willing to spend for a product that was 
produced  without  child  labor,  and  had  been  certified  by  the  NGO  as  such,  when  the 
corresponding, unlabeled product was priced at 25 ECU and 50 ECU, respectively.
7 
The results in Table 3 show large differences between the two groups. For a regular 
price of 25 (50), experienced participants stated an average acceptable premium of 6.6 (6.8), 
much lower than the average acceptable premium of 16.2 (13.2) stated by  inexperienced 
participants. The differences between the means of the two groups are statistically significant 
– t = 4.14 (2.95), p < .01 (.01).   
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
These results show the effect of recent behavioral experience on willingness-to-pay 
statements (a possible “anchoring” effect). They suggest potential bias in surveys that are not 
grounded in experience. They further support the use of experimentation to minimize the gap 
between attitudes and behavior. 
  Finally, the average stated premia for 25 ECU and 50 ECU are similar within both 
experienced  and  inexperienced,  and  the  within-group  differences  are  not  statistically 
significant. However, we do not emphasize this result because the data exhibit considerable 
individual variability. 
                                                
7 We do not rule out that the extra cost of 5 ECU in the experiment influenced the amounts stated. We used only 
data from consumers in both "extra cost known" treatments to assure comparability.   18 
Conclusion and implications 
We conducted market experiments to explore the behavior of economic actors when a 
traded  good  involves  an  ethical  dimension  and  when  selling  the  ethically  differentiated 
version of the good implies an increase in production costs. We show that producers price 
products  with  higher  costs  at  a  premium,  and  that  many  consumers  accept  to  pay  this 
premium when it is linked to an ethical differentiation. In our experiments, we also found that 
consumers pay such premia when they lack knowledge of the amount of extra costs incurred 
by ethical producers.  
The role of individual differences  was emphasized  by the finding that students  of 
economics and business are less prepared to pay ethical premia than students from other 
fields. Our work further demonstrates that people with experience in the ethical experimental 
market state a significantly lower willingness-to-pay than those without such experience.  
Our data can be viewed from perspectives of both consumers and firms. Purchasing 
data can be thought of as illustrating a demand for ethics. The general trend is downward 
sloping  as  confirmed  by  the  negative  coefficients  for  the  price  premium  variable  of  the 
regression analysis reported in Table 2. Figures 2a and 3a show that demand for the ethical 
good  falls  rapidly  between  premia  of  0  to  approximately  5  and  is  quite  flat  thereafter. 
However, as noted above, our data are marked by important individual differences and it is 
unclear how the “demand function” might vary for different segments of the population. (See 
also Carrigan, Szmigin & Wright, 2004, concerning the “older” market.) Understanding such 
variation is an important topic for future research. Moreover, we suspect that this could be 
sensitive to contextual variables that are typically not studied in economic analyses (cf., Hsee 
& Rottenstreich, 2004).   
As  to  producers,  the  existence  of  distinctive  regions  of  price  sensitivity  suggests 
discontinuities in optimal price setting for ethical goods. More specifically, when the general   19 
price level is close to marginal cost, profit is maximized by posting a large premium thereby 
obtaining  high  profit  from  a  small  fraction  of  ethical  consumers.  In  contrast,  the  ethical 
producer’s optimal premium is zero for higher prices where maximal profits are captured by a 
large market share. Indeed, this analysis demonstrates the potential of experimental methods 
to  illuminate  the  consequences  of  different  pricing  strategies  that  would  be  difficult  to 
examine in field studies characterized by inattentive consumers and noisy data – in particular, 
in regions involving low premia and high market shares. Firms can, of course, elect to become 
ethical  producers  for  many  reasons.  Our  work  suggests  the  possibility  of  assessing  the 
economic consequences of such decisions. 
In our experiment, we cannot eliminate the possibility that ethical purchasing behavior 
was subject to a so-called experimenter effect, that is, participants wanted experimenters to 
see that they  had acted  “ethically.”  Such  effects  have  been  documented  in  dictator-game 
experiments (Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 1996). However, it is important to note that our 
experiments differ significantly from dictator games in that they involved repeated market 
transactions  as  opposed  to  single  social  actions.  If  indeed  there  were  such  experimenter 
effects, they could go both ways.
8 In addition, unlike dictator-game experiments, our primary 
goal was not to identify and separate the contributions of different motivations. Indeed, we 
strongly suspect that purchasing ethical goods in the presence of others can induce similar 
social demand effects in the marketplace. Whether, and to what extent ethical purchasing is 
sensitive to higher and lower levels of social presence is an important question for further 
research.
9  
As  noted  at  the outset, this  work  recognizes that contextual variables can play  an 
important  role  in  economic  phenomena.  Specifically,  we  introduced  one  contextual 
                                                
8 After all, economics students seem to be willing to adhere to an "economic normative" of buying at lowest cost. 
Indeed, some of our experimental participants explicitly justified their actions using this argument in the post-
experimental questionnaire.   20 
modification – concerning ethical differentiation – into an otherwise abstract market setting 
and observed the consequences. Our use of a specific contextual variable (i.e., ethical product 
differentiation)  was  guided  by  the  observation  of  a  specific  market  phenomenon  (the 
existence of “fair trade”). We do not claim that all contextual variables would have similar 
impacts.  Finally,  given  the  ambiguity  of  interpreting  empirical  studies  on  the  market  for 
“ethical”  goods,  we  believe  our  approach  provides  a  valuable  complement  for  what  is 
becoming an increasingly important issue for both firms and consumers.   
                                                                                                                                                   
9 For effects of social presence on preferences in another context, see List, Berrens, Bohara, and Kerkvliet 
(2004).   21 
References 
Anderson, R.C. & Hanson, E.N., 2004. Determining Consumer Preferences for Ecolabeled 
Forest Products: An Experimental Approach. Journal of Forestry, 102 (4), 28-32. 
Bjorner, T.B., Hansen, L.G., & Russell, C.S., 2004. Environmental labeling and consumers’ 
choice – an empirical analysis of the effect of the Nordic Swan. Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management, 47 (3), 411-434. 
Cameron, A. C., & Trivedi, P. K., 1998. Regression analysis of count data. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press.   
Carrigan, M., & Attalla, A., 2001. The myth of the ethical consumer – do ethics matter in 
purchasing behaviour?  Journal of Consumer Marketing, 18 (7), 560-577. 
Carrigan, M., Szmigin, I, & Wright, J., 2004. Shopping for a better world? An interpretive 
study of the potential for ethical consumption within the older market. Journal of Consumer 
Marketing, 21 (4), 401-417. 
Cooper, D. J., Kagel, J. H., Lo, W., & Gu, Q. L., 1999. Gaming against managers in incentive 
systems:  Experimental  results  with  Chinese  students  and  Chinese  managers.  American 
Economic Review, 89 (4), 781-804. 
Cooperative Bank (2003). Ethical Consumerism Report 2003. Available at 
http://www.neweconomics.org/gen/uploads/tkuggjui2ngnmpvjyyi5hqrw08012004145902.pdf. 
Accessed November 2005. 
Dufwenberg,  M.,  &  Gneezy,  U.,  2000.  Price  competition  and  market  concentration:  An 
experimental study. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 18, 7-22. 
Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J., 1996. Altruism in anonymous dictator games. Games and 
Economic Behavior, 16, 181-191. 
Einhorn, H. J., & Hogarth, R. M., 1981.  Behavioral decision theory: Processes of judgment 
and choice. Annual Review of Psychology, 32, 53-88. 
FLO  –  Fairtrade  Labeling  Organizations  International,  2005.  Data  available  at 
http://www.fairtrade.net/sites/impact/facts.html. Accessed November 2005. 
Fouraker, L., & Siegel, S., 1963. Bargaining behavior. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.   22 
Frank, R.H., Gilovich T. & Regan, D.T., 1993. Does studying economics inhibit cooperation? 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7 (2), 159-171. 
Gneezy, U. & Nagel, R., 2001. Behavior in symmetric and asymmetric price competition: An 
experimental study.  Mimeo, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. 
Harrison, G.W. & List, J.A., 2004. Field Experiments. Journal of Economic Literature XLII, 
1009-1055. 
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., & Smith, V. L., 1996. Social distance and other-regarding behavior 
in dictator games. American Economic Review, 86 (3), 653-660. 
Hogarth, R. M., 2005. The challenge of representative design in psychology and economics. 
Journal of Economic Methodology, 12 (2), 253-263. 
Hsee,  C.  K.,  &  Rottenstreich,  Y.,  2004.  Music,  pandas,  and  muggers:  On  the  affective 
psychology of value. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 133 (1), 23-30. 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A.  (Eds.), 2000. Choices, values, and frames. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Kimeldorf, H., Meyer, R., Prasad, M. & Robinson, I. (2006). Consumers with a conscience: 
Will they pay more? Contexts 5 (1), 24-29. 
Larrick, R.P., Morgan, J.N. & Nisbett, R.E., 1990. Teaching the use of cost-benefit reasoning 
in everyday life. Psychological Science,  1 (6), 362-370. 
Larrick, R.P., Morgan, J.N. & Nisbett, R.E., 1993. Who uses the cost-benefit rules of choice? 
Implications for the normative status of microeconomic theory. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 56, 331-347. 
List, J. A., Berrens, R. P., Bohara, A. K,  & Kerkvliet, J., 2004. Examining the role of social 
isolation on stated preferences. American Economic Review, 94 (3), 741-752. 
Nisbett,  R.  E.,  Fong,  G.  T.,  Lehman,  D.  R.  &  Cheng,  P.  W.,  1987.  Teaching  reasoning. 
Science, 238, 625-631. 
Pelsmaker, P., Driesen, L. & Rayp, G., 2003. Are fair trade labels good business? Ethics and 
coffee buying intentions. Working Paper, Universiteit Gent.   23 
Shleifer, A., 2004. Does competition destroy ethical behavior? American Economic Review, 
94 (2), 414-418. 
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E. & MacGregor, D. G., 2002. The affect heuristic. In T. 
Gilovitch,  D.  Griffin  &  D.  Kahneman  (Eds.),  Heuristics  and  biases:  The  psychology  of 
intuitive judgment. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 397-420. 
Tallontire, A., Rentsendorj, E. & Blowfeld, M., 2001. Ethical consumers and ethical trade: A 
review of current literature. Policy Series 12, Natural Resources Institute, UK.   
Transfair USA, 2004. available at http://www.transfairusa.org/content/about/pr_040329.php. 
Accessed November 2005. 
Yezer,  M.A.,  Goldfarb,  R.S.  &  Poppen  P.J.,  1996.  Does  studying  economics  discourage 
cooperation? Watch what we do, not what we say or how we play. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 10 (1), 177-186.   24 
 
                   
Table 1 -- Unit sales of producers as a function of C's price relative to those of A and B 
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* Percentage of total number of units (1,620) in parentheses       
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Table 2 -- Regression models for purchases of ethical units 
 
 
   






Poisson RE  
Regression 
Neg. Binomial RE  
Regression 
Treatment 1: "extra cost known" 
Price variables:           
Price level  .012  .022  .021  .035  .037 
  (2.02)*  (3.84)**  (3.69)**  (3.38)**  (3.19)** 
Ethical premium  -.027  -.030  -.030  -.097  -.112 
  (-7.71)**  (-9.30)**  (-9.27)**  (-9.92)**  (-9.28)** 
Individual           
Econ/Business  -.613    -.622  -.912  -.888 
  (-6.87)**    (-3.06)**  (-2.41)*  (-2.42)* 
Other effects:           
First 3 Periods  .064         
  (-.44)         
Wealth  -.004         
  (-.21)         
           
Constant  1.066  0.423  0.872  0.040  2.215 
  (4.63)**  (2.65)**  (3.91)**  (.10)  (3.83)** 
           
Observations  540  540  540  540  540 
# of individuals  36  36  36  36  36 
           
R-squared  .161  .158  .158     
Log Likelihood        -461.6  -456.8 
           
 
Treatment 2: "extra cost unknown" 
Price variables:           
Price level  .078  .113  .097  .071  .071 
  (4.39)**  (7.96)**  (6.62)**  (3.85)**  (3.85)** 
Ethical premium  -.047  -.055  -.050  -.089  -.089 
  (-6.81)**  (-8.44)**  (-7.85)**  (-7.06)**  (-7.06)** 
Individual           
Econ/Business  -.501    -.491  -.491  -.492 
  (-5.62)**    (-3.81)**  (-1.77)+  (-1.77)+ 
Other effects:           
First 3 Periods  -.026         
  (-0,15)         
Wealth  .038  .064  .054  .050  .050 
  (2.00)*  (4.94)**  (3.88)**  (2.68)**  (2.68)** 
           
Constant  -.398  -1.625  -.933  -1.108  15.109 
  (-.81)  (-3.94)**  (-2.12)*  (-1.78)+  (.05) 
           
Observations  540  540  540  540  540 
# of individuals  36  36  36  36  36 
           
R-squared  .235  .260  .234     
Log Likelihood        -582.5  -582.5 
 
Values of t statistics in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   26 
 
                 
                 
                 
   Table 3 -- Comparisons of willingness to pay:     
    Experienced  vs. Inexperienced       
                 
                 
                 
                 
          For regular price of     
 Average acceptable             
 premium in     25 ECU    50 ECU     
 willingness-to-pay             
 statements             
                 
                 
 Experienced (n = 36)    6.6    6.8     
                 
                 
 Inexperienced (n = 36)   16.2    13.2     
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Figure 1b   28 
Premium and Market Share Producer C*
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Figure 2b   29 
Premium and Market Share Producer C*
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Figure 3b   30 
Premium and Market Share Producer C
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Figure 4b   31 




Thank you for participating in this experiment on market decision making, which is part of a 
research  project.  Your  earnings  will  depend  on  your  decisions  and  those  of  the  other 
participants. As a minimum you will earn a show-up fee of 5 Euros. From now on, we ask you 
not to talk to each other till the end of the experiment. If you have any question, please raise 
your hand so that the experimenter can help you. Thank you very much! 
 
You will participate in a market. The market consists of three producers and six consumers. 
You will be randomly assigned to one of these roles at the beginning of the experiment. You 
will remain in that role throughout the entire trading sequence, which consists of 15 periods. 
You will stay in the same market group with the same participants, but you will never know 




This is a market for one product. Three international firms are competing in this market. It is 
publicly known that the production of this good is primarily done in India and Pakistan. 
Although legal regulations against the use of child labor officially exist, the use of various 
forms  of  child  labor  is  expected  to  prevail  both  in  the  supply  chain  and  in  some  final 
production sites. An internationally recognized NGO named MARK is fighting child labor 
practices. It offers a label for the product as “child labor free,” which on the market will be 
indicated by a Star-Symbol (*). In the European market, only licensed MARK producers are 
legally permitted to sell products carrying the MARK label. 
 
To be certified by MARK, producers have to sign a legally binding contract to:  
-  Abandon any use of child labor in their production sites.  
-  Hire adult personnel to fair working conditions and standardized wages. 
-  Allow access to their production sites for unannounced inspections. 
 
MARK provides the following: 
-  Regular monitoring of production sites by local control committees. 
-  Organization of schooling projects for previously employed children. 
-  Education for parents as well as organizational and financial aid to secure the basic 
needs for directly affected families. 
 
All  three  producers  in  the  market  have  been  asked  to  participate  in  this  initiative. 
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Experimental Procedure 
 
On the first screen you will see your personal role for the entire experiment. It can be that you 
have to sell the product as Producer A, Producer B, or Producer C, or to purchase the 
product as Consumer 1,2,3,4,5 or 6.  
Producers 
·  In each period each producer will fix a price for his product simultaneously with the 
other two producers. 
·  Producer A and Producer B do not participate in the MARK initiative to fight child 
labor. Their production costs are 20 ECUs per unit. For each period, Producers A 
and B must post a price between 20 ECUs and 100 ECUs per unit. 
·  Producer  C  is  offering  the  exact  same  product,  but  has  agreed  to  the  MARK 
conditions. Therefore he incurs higher production costs of 25 ECUs per unit. For 
each period, Producer C must post a price between 25 ECUs and 100 ECUs per 
unit.  As  mentioned,  Consumer  C’s  product  will  show  a  star  (*)  symbolizing  the 
MARK label in order for the consumer to distinguish it from producers A and B’s 
products. 
·  The extra production costs of 5 ECUs (of the 25 ECUs) for each (*) unit sold by 
Producer C will be donated to a project against child labor. More specifically, the 
donated money will be paid to the (…)MARK Foundation, which is fighting child 
labour in a specific industry. For more information you can consult the official website 
which is shown at the end of the instructions. For legal questions we will hide the 
name of the product. The transfer for the donation will be made online and visible for 
all participants at the end of the experiment. 
 
 
Producers’ profits (per period):   
[Unit Profit] = [Price offered – Production Cost]*[number of sold units] 
 
Only units that are actually sold create costs. 
Information for each producer after each period: 
 
￿  The prices of all producers in that period, 
￿  The quantities sold by each producer in that period, 
￿  Each producer’s profits in that period, 
￿  The sum of own profits.   33 
Consumers 
 
·  In each period, every one of the six consumers must buy three units of the product. 
·  Each consumer has a budget of 300 ECUs to spend per period. The three units can be 
purchased from one, two, or all of the firms. Thus, you will be asked to indicate on the 
screen how many units you wish to buy from producer A, how many units from 
Producer B, and how many (*) units from producer C (has to add up to three). 
Purchasing decisions remain private information. 
 
Calculation for Consumers’ earnings (per period):  
[Earnings] = [300] – [amount paid to producer A] - [amount paid to producer B] - [amount 
paid to producer C] 
Remember that the amount paid to each producer is the price of the product that this producer 
has posted times the units bought from that producer. 
 
As said, the amount corresponding to Producer C’s extra production costs will be donated. 
  
Calculation for Donations (per period):    
[Donation] = [number of (*) units sold] * [5] 
 
Information for each consumer after each period: 
 
￿  Own earnings in that period,  
￿  Own total earnings, 
￿  The sum of donations in that period, 
￿  The total sum of donations. 
 
All earnings and donations in the experiment involve real money. Three ECUs of 
earnings will be converted into one Euro cent at the end of the experiment, so that 300 
ECUs will be converted into one Euro. Additionally you will be paid the fixed show-up 
fee of five Euros. 
 
If you have any questions please feel free to ask the experimenter any time! 
 














































(...)MARKs official webpage (12-02-2004). 